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Abstract 
The Duty of Care can be considered a corollary of positive obligations, requiring International 
Organizations to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of their staff members, as well as their 
health and safety. This Chapter explores the different sources of human rights obligations for 
International Organizations, with reference to both treaty law and customary law. It is argued then 
that human rights obligations bearing upon International Organizations include a positive dimension 
as well. Positive obligations are in fact addressed as inherent in the nature of substantial human 
rights rules, rather than as the outcome of the interpretation of human rights treaties by regional 
courts or UN Committees. Finally, after a tentative definition of the main features and content of 
Duty of Care, the Chapter clarifies to what extent the principle of specialty might affect 
International Organizations’ human rights positive obligations. 
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13.1 Introduction 
 
The Duty of Care can be considered a corollary of positive obligations, requiring international 
organizations not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life (or from the 
violation of physical and moral integrity) of their civilian personnel sent on mission, but also to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard their lives, as well as their health and safety.1  
 A major problem with this construction is that positive obligations commonly refer to the 
duty of States over people under their ‘jurisdiction’. While international tribunals, and primarily the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its case law concerning the extraterritorial application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), contributed to defining the scope and 
meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ and to elaborating on the contents of positive obligations, more 
uncertainty surrounds the likelihood to attribute similar obligations to International Organizations. 
The present Chapter explores this possibility in detail.  
It begins with a preliminary issue, namely whether - and to what extent – International 
Organizations are bound by international human rights law. Once it has been argued that the 
evolution of International Organizations, on the one hand, and the progressive ‘humanization’ of 
international law, on the other, explain the relevance of human rights with regard to the 
International Organizations’ scope of action (Sect. 2), the Chapter will explore the different sources 
of human rights obligations for International Organizations, with reference to both treaty law and 
customary law (Sect. 3). Positive obligations - as developed in the case law of regional human 
rights courts and in the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence - are then analysed and their 
applicability to International Organizations is explained (Sect. 4). Finally, after having provided a 
tentative definition of the main features and content of Duty of Care as a corollary of human rights 
positive obligations to protect life, health and safety (Sect. 5), the Chapter clarifies to what extent 
the principle of specialty might affect International Organizations’ positive human rights 
obligations (Sect. 6). 
 
13.2 Humanization, institutionalisation and the relevance of International Organizations in 
the protection of human rights 
 
                                                          
* Ludovica Poli, Assistant Professor of International Law, University of Turin - Department of Law, 
ludovica.poli@unito.it. 
1 De Guttry 2012, p 276. 
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Some scholars voice a certain hesitation in identifying a framework of human rights binding for 
International Organizations stressing the ‘difficulties in thinking of human rights as owed by 
anything but sovereign states’.2 Indeed, it is true that the same idea of fundamental rights is 
traditionally tangled with the concept of State and that rights have historically described the 
relationship between the sovereign and the citizens.3 However, a more attentive analysis explains 
how human rights are currently pivotal in any Organization’s scope of action. 
Since the end of World War II, the international legal order has undergone two major 
developments: first, a constantly growing process of permeation of international law by human 
rights and, second, an increasing institutionalisation of the cooperation among States. 
The mainstreaming of human rights into all the aspects and dynamics of the international 
community is now undeniable. Not only has international law gradually become a catalyst for the 
protection of individuals from governments,4 fuelled by a phenomenon identified by some Scholars 
as ‘human-rightism’,5 but, in a more macroscopic perspective, human rights have exercised and 
continuously sustain a profound transformation on general international law.6 As Meron stresses, 
‘humanization of public international law under the impact of human rights has shifted its focus 
above all from State-centered to individual-centered’.7  
On the other hand, international law has also moved from being a law of ‘co-existence’, i.e. 
a body of rules pursuing the main aim of bounding spheres of influence between States,8 to 
representing the legal foundation of an intense and growing cooperation among States. Such 
international cooperation has gradually assumed an institutionalised nature, with International 
Organizations being established for different purposes and accredited with competencies adequate 
to perform specific functions. Over time International Organizations – originally tasked with 
managing problems common to many States, working as ‘purely “vehicles” of their member states’ 
interests in narrowly determined areas’9 - have become multifunctional entities assigned with 
functions and competencies affecting vital interests for the entire community of States. 
As a result of the interaction of these two processes, ‘humanization’ and 
‘institutionalisation’ of public international law, International Organizations are constantly gaining 
broader competences and increased ability to directly impact individuals and their legal position. In 
                                                          
2 Mégret and Hoffmann 2003, p 320. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Cogan 2011, p 323, quoting Higgins 1994, p 105.  
5 Pronto 2007, p 754; see for an argument a contrario, Pellet 2000. 
6 Tzevelekos 2013, p 62. See also Pisillo-Mazzeschi 2008, p 199 ff. 
7 Meron 2006, Introduction. 
8 Klabbers 2015, p 16. 
9 Faix 2014, p 273. 
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fact, not only are human rights at the top of the agenda of many International Organizations10 - 
entitled, as they are, to promote, encourage and sometimes even monitor the protection of 
fundamental rights by their member States - but also International Organizations themselves are 
urged to guarantee human rights in performing their functions.  
There is no doubt, therefore, that International Organizations can breach human rights in 
their operational actions,11 as well as in their normative activity.12 Unsurprisingly, then, scholars 
have focused on issues of responsibility of International Organizations for violations of human 
rights law, sometimes denouncing a disturbing lack of accountability.13 The present Chapter, 
however, will focus exclusively on the sources and the nature of human rights binding International 
Organizations, with the intention to explore the Duty of Care as a corollary of positive obligations, 
requiring International Organizations to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives, health and 
security of civilian personnel sent on mission.  
 
13.3 Sources of human rights obligations for International Organizations 
 
As stated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the advisory opinion on the Interpretation of 
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt14, International Organizations enjoy 
an international legal personality. Sources of law applicable to International Organizations can be 
classified in three categories: 1) treaty law, including constitutive instruments and human rights 
treaties; 2) general law, comprising customary law and general principles of law; 3) and, finally, 
internal acts. 
 
13.3.1 Treaty Law 
 
                                                          
10 Faix 2014, p 274. 
11 As underlined by Mégret and Hoffmann 2003, p 316 ff., this is patently evident in the case of the UN 
international transitional civil administration in East Timor or in Kosovo. 
12 Le Floch 2015, p 381, referring to the side effects over the population of UN sanctions against Iraq in the 
‘90s. 
13 Le Floch 2015, p 383. 
14 ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
20 December 1980, I.C.J. Rep. 1980, p 90, para 37: ‘international organizations are subjects of international 
law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties’. The same 
principle was implied in the Court’s argument in the Reparation for injury case, where it stated that, being a 
subject of international law, any international organization is ‘capable of possessing international rights and 
duties’: ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 
April 1949, I.C.J. Rep. 1949, p 179. 
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Human rights obligations may arise either from the treaty establishing the Organization, defining its 
aims and regulating its functioning and main activities, or from other human rights treaties.  
 
13.3.1.1 Constitutive instruments 
 
International Organizations are certainly bound by obligations arising under their constituent 
instrument, notwithstanding the fact that they are not a party to it.15 However, it is not always easy 
to define how obligations to respect human rights can be distilled from their founding treaties, since 
these constitutive instruments very rarely impose in explicit terms on the Organizations themselves 
an obligation to respect human rights.  
The Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) represents an 
exception.16 Art 2 para 1 states that the action of Interpol - and in particular, the promotion of ‘the 
widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities’ - is carried out, not only 
within the limits of the law existing in the different countries, but also ‘in the spirit of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’. The respect of human rights is thus considered a clear parameter for 
the activity of the Organization. While it is clear that the Declaration remains a non-binding 
document, the reference to its spirit as a guidance for Interpol activities, signifies the intention to 
bind the Organization to human rights. 
Nevertheless, constitutive instruments do not usually include the respect of human rights 
among the principles governing the action of the International Organization, even when they insert 
the promotion of these fundamental rights within the aims or activities of the Organization. In the 
case of the United Nations (UN), for example, Art 1 para 3 of the San Francisco Charter lists the 
promotion of ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion’ among the main aims of the Organization, while Art 55 imposes 
on the UN a duty to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.  
However, as argued by Verdirame, human rights obligations can be always derived 
implicitly by constitutive instruments, once it is accepted that these documents could accommodate 
implied terms. In fact, ‘there is no reason in principle why only terms that confer powers on the 
organisations should be susceptible to implication. Obligations can be implied too’.17 In this 
                                                          
15 Verdirame 2011, p 73. 
16 On the qualification of Interpol as an International Governmental Organization, see Runavot 2015, pp 26 
ff. 
17 Verdirame 2011, p 81. 
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perspective, implied obligations are a mirror of implied powers.18 
This conclusion finds a corroboration in the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Effect of 
Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. According to the 
Court,  
it would [...] hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom 
and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the United Nations 
Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its 
own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them.19  
 
While the Court, in justifying the establishment of an Administrative Tribunal by the 
General Assembly, did not explicitly declare that the UN had the implied duty to provide its 
personnel with a remedy of dispute settlement, it did admit that failure to offer such remedy would 
be incompatible with the Charter.20 It thus derived from the general engagement in the field of 
human rights of the Organization a clear guidance for its activity. 
 
13.3.1.2 Human Rights Treaties 
 
Some authors consider that human rights obligations bearing upon International Organizations 
might derive from the pre-existing treaty-based duties of their member States.21 This idea is 
alternatively developed referring to the derivative or secondary nature of the international legal 
personality of International Organizations, or to the rules governing succession of States in respect 
of treaties.  
It has been asserted that, since the legal personality of International Organizations is 
derivative (as they are established by other subjects of law), they would necessarily be bound by the 
obligations of the member States, at least according to a due diligence obligation, impeding them 
from hindering their member States from fulfilling their treaty obligations.22 While this position 
might seem appealing, it encounters a number of practical problems. First, it would cover only 
obligations existing before the transfer of powers from States to the International Organization, 
excluding any agreement concluded after it.23 Second, the definition of extension of the obligations 
bearing upon International Organizations could potentially lead to an untenable situation, with some 
                                                          
18 Verdirame 2011, p 75. 
19 ICJ, Effect of awards of compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 13 
July 1954, I.C.J. Rep. 1954, p 47. 
20 Verdirame 2011, p 71. 
21 Le Floch 2015, p 389. 
22 Ibid, quoting Forteau 2009. 
23 Naert 2010, p 134. 
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members not accepting that the Organization is bound by treaties ratified by other States parties but 
not by themselves.24 
Other scholars consider that International Organizations  are called to  respect  human  rights  
treaties in  the  areas  in  which  they replace States’ activity,  in view  of  the  competences  
attributed  to  them.25 An analogy with the rules of State succession with respect to treaties has been 
suggested to substantiate this conclusion.26 Such analogy, however, is highly problematic, since 
International Organizations do not entirely replace their member States ‘in the responsibility for the 
international relations’, as provided by Art 1 para 2 (b) of the Vienna Convention 1978 on 
succession of States in regard to treaties.27  More generally, this idea is not convincing: first, only 
rarely is there a real transfer of powers, rather than the creation of new ones28 and, even more 
rarely, States confer exclusive competences to International Organizations. Additionally, as 
explained by Faix, the transfer of powers does not necessarily imply the transfer of human rights 
obligations.29  
It is worth noting that the main reason why attempts are made to extend to International 
Organizations the duties in the field of human rights protection bearing upon States is to avoid the 
circumvention by the States of their own treaty obligations. However, this goal is better enforced 
through mechanisms relying on State responsibility. 30 
Any International Organization, therefore, needs to explicitly adhere to human rights treaties 
to be bound by the obligations envisaged in them. It is true that human rights treaties are generally 
and traditionally open to States only. In fact, the same idea of human rights protection comes from 
the urgency to preserve some basic needs and interests of individuals from interferences and even 
breaches committed by the State in the exercise of its sovereign powers. However, the situation 
might change in future, since the enlargement of International Organizations’ competences, on the 
one hand, and their voluntary acceptance of certain human rights obligations in the fields of their 
                                                          
24 Naert 2010, p 134. 
25 Le Floch 2015, p 390, quoting Pescatore 2000.  
26 Klein 1998, p 331 ff., mainly referring to the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
27 Naert 2010, p 132, Le Floch 2015, p 390. 
28 Naert 2010, p 132. 
29 Faix 2014, p 283. 
30 Art 61 of the draft articles on responsibility of International Organizations makes it clear, stating that any 
State member  of  an  International  Organization incurs  international responsibility  if,  by  taking  
advantage  of  the  fact  that  the  Organization  has competence  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter  of  one  
of  the  State’s  international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the Organization to 
commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation (Draft 
articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries 2011, adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General Assembly as a 
part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10)) This rule, as the commentary 
well explains, derives from the case law of the ECtHR on equivalent protection (De Schutter 2010, pp 78-
86). See Spagnolo, Chap. 3. 
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activities31 might encourage greater participation of International Organizations in human rights 
treaties. This would probably require some time, as most of the treaties would need to be modified 
to make accession by International Organizations concretely achievable.32 For the time being, the 
only example of an Organization party to a human rights treaty is represented by the European 
Union’s (EU) accession to the UN Convention on Person with Disabilities, while - as is well known 
- the more ambitious project of the EU accession to the ECHR has definitely failed.33 
 
13.3.2 General Law 
  
Most of the human rights obligations bearing upon International Organizations have their legal 
foundation in general law, namely customary law and/or general principles of law.  
 
13.3.2.1 Customary Law 
 
Custom requires both a general practice among States and the belief that a rule of law requires it.34 
One may wonder whether International Organizations are bound by any rule of customary 
international law, or if there is the need for a specific institutional practice and an assessed opinio 
juris in respect of each customary rule.35 According to the already mentioned advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice on the WHO-Egypt Agreement, the fact of being subjects of 
international law implies that International Organizations would be ‘bound by any obligations 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law’.36 Therefore, neither ascertaining the 
specific adherence to a certain practice by each International Organization, nor determining its 
opinio juris are necessary steps. This is consistent with the approach taken towards new 
independent States in the 1950s and 1960s.37 It would not be acceptable, and ‘extremely disruptive 
                                                          
31 De Schutter 2010, p 110. 
32 See, for a different opinion: Poretto and Vitè 2006, pp 43-44. 
33 With the Opinion no. 2/13, delivered on 18 December 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
excluded the compatibility with EU law of the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. While noticing that the lack of a legal basis for the EU’s accession - 
previously stressed in the Opinion no. 2/94 of 28 March 1996 - has been resolved by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the Court insisted on the special features of the EU referring, in particular to the autonomy of the EU legal 
order.  
34 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shell (Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands and Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Denmark), Judgement 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Rep. 1969, p 44, para 77. 
35 Verdirame 2011, p 56. 
36 ICJ, Interpretation  of  the  Agreement  of  25  March  1951  Between  the  WHO  and  Egypt, pp 89-90. 
37 Verdirame 2011, p 71. 
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for the international system’,38 to admit the presence on the international plane of subjects enjoying 
a legal personality, but exempt from generally accepted rules. 
Worth mentioning is also the role that International Organizations play in the emergence and 
consolidation of customary law rules. In fact, they represent incredibly fecund fora where States can 
develop a ‘usus’, while the practice of International Organizations themselves might also be 
relevant for customary law. This is in particular evident considering the contribution provided by 
International Organizations in the codification of general international law or in its improvement, 
through the adoption of soft law documents that might guide, legitimate and reinforce States’ 
behaviour. 
 
13.3.2.2 General Principles 
 
Some scholars consider it more appropriate to refer to general principles of law as the main source 
of human rights obligations for International Organizations.39 The reference would be, therefore, to 
the ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ mentioned under Art 38 ICJ Statute, 
namely principles common to the main legal traditions, enshrined in domestic legal orders and 
absorbed into international law. General principles had (and still play) a fundamental role in the 
formulation of human rights standards, as well as in their interpretation and application.40  
According to Le Floch, it is even possible to argue - at least in the field of human rights 
protection - a new understanding of the general principles of law and to identify them in the 
principles common to the various international conventions on human rights.41 This interpretation is 
closer to a different notion of general principles, covering autonomous principles of international 
law, expressing the essence of the international legal system. In this sense, the advantage of positing 
general principles as sources of human rights obligations would consist in encouraging a profitable 
interpretation of human rights, insisting on the existing connections between various conventional 
systems.42 
 
13.3.3 Internal acts and self-regulation 
 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 De Schutter 2010, p 68. Amerasinghe, as well, considers that the respect of human rights is founded on 
general principles (Amerasinghe 2010, pp 528-529). 
40 O’Boyle and Lafferty 2013, p 195. 
41 Le Floch 2015, p 392. 
42 Ibid. 
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A further possible source of human rights obligations for International Organizations is represented 
by internal acts as a form of self-regulation. As De Schutter notes, many International Organizations 
are currently developing procedures to ensure compliance with human rights standards in their 
specific fields of activity.43  
While many documents are prescriptive in nature, at least considering the internal legal 
order of the Organization, not all institutional or internal acts have the explicit effect of binding the 
International Organization on the international level.44 The principles concerning unilateral acts 
adopted by States - which have been detailed by the International Court of Justice in its case law - 
appear certainly applicable by analogy to those internal acts binding the Organization on the 
international plane.  
Therefore, the form in which the statement is made is not essentially relevant. As the Court 
underlined in its Judgment on the preliminary objections in the case concerning the Temple of 
Preah Vihear, international law ‘places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the parties’ and 
therefore ‘the law prescribes no particular form, [and] parties are free to choose what form they 
please provided their intention clearly results from it’.45  
In fact, exactly as with unilateral acts of States, the principle of good faith explains the 
binding nature of internal acts:  
trust and confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in  particular in  an age  when  
this cooperation in  many  fields  is becoming  increasingly  essential.  Just as the very rule 
of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding 
character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus interested 
States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are 
entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected.46  
 
In other words, even if these rules appear to be internal, to the extent they make clear the 
intention of the International Organization to respect human rights and - as a consequence - 
generate legitimate expectations at the international level, they are sources of human rights 
obligations for the Organization. 
 
                                                          
43 De Schutter 2010, p 104, referring, on the one hand, to the operational policies integrating human rights 
issues developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, along with mechanisms for 
monitoring compliance and, on the other, to UNIMIK accession to monitoring mechanisms established 
within the Council of Europe. 
44 Verdirame 2011, p 84, mentioning some standard-setting resolutions of the General Assembly, including 
GA Res. 45/111 (‘Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners’); GA Res. 45/113 (‘UN Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty’); GA Res. 45/110 (‘UN Standard Minimum Rules for non-
Custodial Measures’); GA Res. 40/33 (‘UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice’). 
45 ICJ, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 26 May 1961, I.C.J. Rep. 1961, p 31.  
46 ICJ, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Rep. 1974, p 268. 
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13.4 Positive obligations and the Duty of Care  
 
Now it has been ascertained that human rights obligations for International Organizations might 
derive from treaties, as well as from general law, and can also be enshrined in institutional acts 
having the same nature and effect as States’ unilateral declarations, it is now necessary to consider 
in more detail positive obligations as they have been developed in the case law of regional courts as 
well as by the Human Rights Committee. The aim of the present Section is to assess whether 
positive obligations can also bind International Organizations. 
The Duty of Care can be described as a corollary of human rights positive obligations to 
protect life, health and safety of staff members. While the right to life is explicitly envisaged in 
numerous treaties,47 the protection of health and safety derives from different provisions. Along 
with a specific provision on the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health, envisaged under Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),48 it derives also from the prohibition of torture and inhuman degrading 
treatments49 and the right to private life,50 to the extent that these provisions protect the physical and 
moral integrity of individuals. Additionally, relevance is to be attributed to the right to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, envisaged by Art 7 ICESCR, explicitly 
referring to the right to safe and healthy working conditions. 
It is commonly accepted that the effective exercise of freedoms and the genuine enjoyment 
of rights do not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may rather require positive 
measures of protection, even in the sphere of the relations between individuals. In particular, 
international law rules protecting life and/or physical and moral integrity imply not only that States 
have to refrain from intentional and unlawful deprivation of life, from committing torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatments, or from arbitrarily interfering in the private life of people, but also that 
they must take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives and the integrity of those within their 
jurisdiction.51 In fact, protection of human rights needs to be ‘practical and effective’.52 
                                                          
47 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UN Treaty 
Series vol 999 p 171, entered into force 23 March 1976, ICCPR, art 6; European Convention on Human 
Rights opened for signature 4 November 1950, ETS no 005, entered into force 3 September 1953, ECHR, art 
2; American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November  1969, OAS, Treaty Series no 
36, entered into force 18 July 1978, ACHR, art 4; African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights opened for 
signature 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, entered into force 21 October 1986, AfrCHR, art 
4. 
48 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature16 December 1966, 
UN Treaty Series vol 993, p 3, entered into force 3 January 1976, ICESCR. 
49 ICCPR art 7; ECHR art 3; ACHR art 5; AfrCHR art 5.  
50 ICCPR art 17; ECHR art 8; ACHR art 11. 
51 See Macchi, Chap. 14. 
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As is well known, a large contribution to the definition and regulation of positive obligations 
comes from the case law of the ECtHR. While some provisions of the ECHR might appear per se as 
setting a positive action by the State,53 the legal basis of positive obligations is more properly 
identified in the provision contained in Art 1 ECHR.54 To the extent that this provision requires 
States to ensure the concrete and effective enjoyment of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Convention, it enlarges its scope to include positive obligations. Positive obligations also underpin 
the so-called ‘horizontal effect’ of the Convention, which permits the extension of its guarantees to 
interpersonal relationships. Any State might be held responsible by the EctHR whenever it fails to 
(legally or materially) prevent or punish a violation of the ECHR committed by individuals. As 
such, the emergence and the development of the horizontal effect of the Convention derives from 
and is a consequence of the theory of positive obligations,55 but it is not extraneous to other 
instruments. Moreover, its relevance needs to be understood in view of its meaning and impact on 
human rights protection: as Pisillo-Mazzeschi explains, the effective enjoyment of a large number 
of human rights would be seriously threatened if States were not obliged to prevent and respond to 
abuses committed in the sphere of relations between private individuals.56  
While the major contribution on the development of the notion of positive obligations is laid 
down in the case law of the EctHR, positive obligations might be derived from other human rights 
instruments, including the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (AfrCHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the ICESCR. 
In particular, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has described the 
obligations contained in Art 1 of the ACHR – namely the duty to ‘respect’ the rights and freedoms 
recognised in the Convention and the duty to ‘ensure’ to all persons the free and full exercise of 
these rights and freedoms – as ‘the prism through which [recognizing] concrete obligations under 
specific human rights’.57 Therefore, these two duties, read in conjunction with specific rights, might 
generate positive obligations, whose content depends upon the circumstances and features of each 
case, but in general involve the duty to prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights 
and, furthermore, restore the right violated providing compensation.58 Additionally, the obligation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
52 van Dijk and van Hoof 1998, p 74. 
53 For example, the first sentence of the first paragraph of Art 2 ECHR, stating that ‘everyone’s right to life 
shall be protected by law’, clearly requires a positive intervention by the State to protect the right to life. 
54 Art 1 ECHR: ‘the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’. 
55 Akandji-Kombe 2007, p 15. 
56 Pisillo-Mazzeschi 2008, p 227. 
57 Lavrysen 2014, p 95. 
58  ACtHR , Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, 29 July 1988, App. No 7920, para 166. 
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contained in Art 2 ACHR, according to which States Parties ‘undertake to adopt, [...] such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedom’, implies 
the obligation to refrain from enacting norms or practices that violate human rights, but also the 
positive obligation for the State to ‘adopt all measures so that the provisions of the Convention are 
effectively fulfilled in its domestic legal system’.59 
Art 1 of the AfrCHR is perfectly in line with the approach of the ACHR, as it stresses the 
need for the States parties not only to recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the 
instrument, but also ‘to undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them’. In 
its general comment no. 3 on the on the right to life, guaranteed by Art 4 of the AfrCHR, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) affirmed that ‘the right to life 
should be interpreted broadly. The State has a positive duty to protect individuals and groups from 
real and immediate risks to their lives caused either by actions or inactions of third parties’.60  
Unsurprisingly, the ACmHPR has derived positive obligations from Art 1 of the AfrCHR in a 
number of cases,61 in particular, in the cases  SERAC v. Nigeria,62 and Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe. 63 
Finally, positive obligations derive also from the ICCPR and ICESCR provisions, as 
confirmed by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in their general comments and jurisprudence.  
In particular, the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment no. 3 on the nature of States 
parties obligations clarified that the obligation to respect and ensure the rights recognised in the 
ICCPR ‘is both negative and positive in nature’, as States parties not only have to refrain from 
violation of the rights recognised by the Covenant, but they are also called to ‘adopt legislative, 
judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal 
                                                          
59 ACtHR , Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile (“The Last Temptation of Christ”), 5 February 2001, App. No. 
11803, para 87. 
60 ACmHPR 2015, para 41. 
61 Mba 2009. 
62ACmHPR, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
v. Nigeria, Decision 27 October 2001, Communication no 155/96, para 44: ‘internationally accepted ideas of 
the various obligations engendered by human rights indicate that all rights - both civil and political rights and 
social and economic - generate at least four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights 
regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These obligations universally 
apply to all rights and entail a combination of negative and positive duties. As a human rights instrument, the 
African Charter is not alien to these concepts’. 
63 ACmHPR, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Decision 15 May 2006, Comm. No. 
245/2002, para 143: ‘[…] human rights standards do not contain merely limitations on State’s authority or 
organs of State. They also impose positive obligations on States to prevent and sanction private violations of 
human rights. Indeed, human rights law imposes obligations on States to protect citizens or individuals under 
their jurisdiction from the harmful acts of other’. 
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obligations’.64 In the same document, the Committee underlined that some articles of the Covenant 
envisage ‘areas where there are positive obligations on States Parties to address the activities of 
private persons or entities’:65 reference is made in particular to Art 7, stating that ‘States Parties 
have to take positive measures to ensure that private persons or entities do not inflict torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on others within their power’.66 The point is 
also stressed in General Comment no. 20 on the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment.67 
Additionally, dealing with the right to life, enshrined in Art 6 of the ICCPR, the Human 
Rights Committee has clarified, in its General Comment no. 6, that: ‘the right to life has been too 
often narrowly interpreted. The expression “inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood in 
a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures’.68 
Lastly, positive obligations and the ‘horizontal effect’ of the Covenant have been recognised with 
reference to right to liberty and security guaranteed under Art 9 of the ICCPR69 and the right to 
privacy envisaged under Art 17 of the ICCPR.70  
Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stressed the positive 
dimension of the right to health71 and of the right to enjoy just and favourable conditions of work.72 
The Human Rights Committee has also been called many times to decide on positive 
obligations deriving from the ICCPR, in its jurisprudence on individual communications.73 From its 
views, it clearly emerges that the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, as well as the right to liberty and security of person require positive measures 
of protection ‘irrespective of whether the actual atrocity is connected to the State party’.74 
While the analysis of regional human rights courts’ case law, as well as the Human Rights 
Committee’s jurisprudence, might suggest that positive obligations are a ‘judge-made opus or 
structure’,75 it is maintained here that they are rather inherent in the nature of substantial human 
                                                          
64 Human Rights Committee 1981, paras 6-7. 
65 Ibid., para 8. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Human Rights Committee 1992, para 2: ‘it is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection 
through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by Art 7, whether 
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity’. 
68 Human Rights Committee 1982, para 6. 
69 Human Rights Committee 2014. 
70 Human Rights Committee 1988, para 9. 
71 CESCR 2000, para 33. 
72 CESCR 2016, para 61. 
73 Human Rights Committee, Abubakar Amirov v. Russian Federation, 2 April 2009, Comm. No. 1447/2006. 
74 Human Rights Committee, Individual concurring opinion by the Committee member Anja Seibert-Fohr, 
Nura Hamulić and Halima Hodžić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 March 2015, Comm. No. 2022/2011. 
75 Akandji-Kombe 2007, p 6. The first two cases in which the Court developed the notion are Marckx and 
Airey, both adopted in 1979, where – dealing with Art 8 ECHR – the Court stated that, although the object of 
such provision ‘is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
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rights rules. As such, these obligations have not been conceived and designed by regional courts or 
the Human Rights Committee, but they have rather found a clear identification under their impetus, 
driven by the need to provide an effective guarantee to convention rights. Therefore, even if the 
trigger for their emergence within the regional human rights systems has been the existence of an 
explicit convention duty to assure these rights, positive obligations are not necessarily conditioned 
by such a treaty provision, since this positive dimension describes the content of the rights to life 
and to physical and moral integrity per se. It is therefore possible to argue that, as long as the 
fundamental rights to life and to physical and moral integrity are customary law – and, as such, 
binding on International Organizations as well – they necessarily imply a positive dimension. 
In line with this argument, it has also been stressed that the horizontal effects of human 
rights treaties, traditionally considered to derive from the judicial activism of human rights courts, 
should be rather considered as an application, to human rights, of principles governing State 
responsibility with regard to acts of individuals, widely developed in other fields of international 
law, such as the treatment of aliens.76 
 
13.5 Positive obligations and due diligence: a tentative definition of the contents of 
International Organizations’ Duty of Care 
 
Exactly as with States,  the scope of positive obligations bearing upon International Organizations 
can vary significantly, not only with reference to different rights, but also in view of ‘the diversity 
of situations [...], the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and the choices which must 
be made in terms of priorities and resources’.77 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family 
life’. ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, App. No. 6833/74, para 31; Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 
1979, App. No. 6289/73, para 32. 
76 Pisillo-Mazzeschi 2008, p 228: ‘[…] les actes des particuliers ne sont pas attribués à l’Etat, mais peuvent 
seulement représenter l’occasion extérieure pour un fait illicite différent, commis par les organes étatiques 
qui n’ont pas prévenu ou réprimé ces actes. En substance, l’Etat répond seulement si ses propres organes ont 
violé, par leur conduite d’omission, leur devoir de protection. […] [C]ette orientation doit être étendue du 
secteur de la protection des étrangers au secteur des droits de l’homme et elle constitue la base théorique 
pour justifier la théorie des effets horizontaux des droits de l’homme. Lorsque certains droits de l’homme 
imposent, explicitement ou implicitement, des obligations positives à effets horizontaux à la charge de l’Etat, 
la responsabilité de ce dernier ne naît que lorsqu’on démontre que les organes étatiques n’ont pas rempli leur 
devoir de protéger, par le biais de mesures de prévention ou de répression, les individus destinataires de ces 
obligations contre des immixtions arbitraires de la part d’autres individus privés’. 
77 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, Research Report: Positive obligations on member 
States under Art10 to protect journalists and prevent impunity, December 2011, p 4. 
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This section will tentatively provide some guidelines in defining the contents of the Duty of 
Care of International Organizations as a corollary of positive obligations to protect the right to life, 
health and safety of civilian personnel sent on mission.  
In line with what the IACtHR has stressed in the case Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, we 
assume here that International Organizations’ positive obligations to protect the life, health and 
safety of their personnel imply four separate dimensions. First, the duty to prevent harmful acts by 
individuals against personnel; second, the duty to investigate harmful acts; third, the duty to punish 
persons responsible for harmful acts; and fourth, the duty to provide reparation.78 Worth noting is 
that each of these duties includes an obligation of result (possessing the necessary 
legal/administrative apparatus to prevent, investigate, punish and provide reparation) and an 
obligation of conduct (i.e. use this apparatus with due diligence).79 
The duty to prevent certainly plays a central role, as it is a prerequisite to successfully 
accomplish other obligations of investigation, punishment and reparation.80 For this reason, ‘the 
general protection offered by the legal and administrative framework must be “integral”: it requires 
both the prevention of risk factors and the strengthening of institutions that could provide an 
effective response to human rights violations’.81 
It is therefore pivotal to underline that the duty to possess the necessary legal and 
administrative apparatus to prevent (which is clearly confirmed by the ECtHR82 and the ACtHR83 
                                                          
78 A similar detailed list is contained under Art 5.2 of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women (opened for signature on 11 May 2011, CETS no 210, entered into force on 1 
August 2014), which distinguishes between negative and positive obligations and connects positive 
obligations with due diligence.   
79 This distinction is drawn - mutatis mutandis - from the work of Pisillo-Mazzeschi (1992) on the State’s 
duty to protect aliens and foreign States representatives from harmful acts committed by private individuals. 
The Author explains that this duty includes two dimensions (the duty to prevent harmful acts and the duty to 
punish those responsible whenever a harmful act has occurred), stressing that each of them includes an 
obligation of conduct and an obligation of result. In particular, the duty to prevent is divided into the 
obligation to possess the necessary legal and administrative apparatus ‘normally able to guarantee respect for 
the international norm on prevention’ (p 26), namely an obligation of result, and into the obligation to use 
such apparatus with due diligence, an obligation of conduct. The duty to punish also includes the duty to 
possess a minimum apparatus, which is not conditioned by due diligence requirement, and the duty to use it 
this enforcement mechanism, which depends only in part on due diligence. In fact, Pisillo-Mazzeschi 
additionally distinguishes between the duty to investigate, pursue and apprehend persons responsible for the 
harmful acts (which is subjected to due diligence) and the duty to try such persons, inflict a penalty and make 
sure this is properly carried out, which he considers an obligation of result (pp 28-29).  See also Pisillo-
Mazzeschi 2008, pp 390 ff. 
80 Lavrysen 2014, p 100. 
81 Lavrysen 2014, p 99, quoting Ferrer Mac-Gregor, 2012. 
82 ECtHR (GC), Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, App. No. 23452/94; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 
2000, App. No. 22535/93; Akkoç v. Turkey, 10 October 2000, App. No. 22947-22948/93. 
83 IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras; Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, 20 January 1989, App. No. 8097. 
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case law) is derived from human rights law as a comprehensive set of rules, since it is necessary to 
achieve the general purpose of the respect and protection of fundamental rights.84  
The fourfold structure sketched by the ACtHR in Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, is 
certainly useful to identify the different components of the positive obligations bearing upon 
International Organizations. However, it is obvious that none of these components (the duty to 
prevent, the duty to investigate, the duty to punish and the duty to provide reparation) has exactly 
the same content as the similar obligations bearing upon the State. This is particularly evident in the 
case of investigation and punishment, where the apparatus and the activity required by an 
International Organization is not comparable to that which is expected from a State. However, this 
should not be understood as preventing the Organization from having a role in investigating and/or 
punishing the harmful acts. This will simply imply that the Organization is expected to perform 
different actions from the territorial and sending States, but still in the same direction, namely with 
the aim of ascertaining the facts, finding those responsible and ensuring they are properly 
sanctioned.  
This conclusion is also consistent with a principle clearly outlined in international case law, 
and in particular by the ECtHR in the case Osman v. United Kingdom.85 The so-called ‘Osman test’ 
was formulated by the Court at para. 117, when it stated that, to determine whether the British 
government had violated its duty to prevent violations of the right to life committed by an 
individual,  
it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at 
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures 
within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to 
avoid that risk.86  
 
As explained by Ebert and Sijniensky, this simple formula implies a set of criteria.87 A first 
step consists in assessing whether the State (but this is certainly applicable to International 
Organizations by analogy) had any preventative duties with reference to the violation of the right to 
life at issue. The answer might be in the affirmative, as long as there was a risk of a violation of the 
right to life, which could be considered ‘real’, ‘immediate’, ‘against identifiable individuals’ and 
that State knew or, given the circumstances of the case, was expected to know. A second step is to 
understand the scope of the duty to prevent. The ECtHR considers that the measures to be adopted 
                                                          
84 Pisillo-Mazzeschi 2008, p 334. 
85 ECtHR, Osman v. UK. 
86 Ibid., para 117. 
87 Ebert and Sijniensky 2015, p 347. 
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by the State, first, have to remain within the scope of its powers88 and, second, need to be 
reasonably useful to avoid the risk of a violation of the right to life. In any case, positive obligations 
could not be interpreted to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the domestic 
authorities.89  The same approach was adopted by the IACtHR in the judgment on the case Pueblo 
Bello massacre v. Colombia, when the Court held that the State’s ‘obligations to adopt prevention 
and protection measures for individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned by the 
awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of 
individuals and to the reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger’.90 Again, this 
step is applicable by analogy to International Organizations, as the analysis on the principle of 
specialty in the next Section clearly confirms. 
 
13.6 The principle of specialty and the distinction between negative and positive obligations 
 
We have ascertained that International Organizations are bound by human rights obligations as far 
as these are also enshrined in customary law (unless the Organization accedes to a human rights 
treaty). We have also argued that human rights obligations concerning the right to life and to 
physical and moral integrity do imply an inherent positive dimension, which does not necessarily 
depend on a provision in a convention. A last crucial issue concerns how the peculiarities of the 
legal personality of International Organizations may affect an International Organization’s human 
rights obligations.  
In fact, since any International Organization enjoys a functional legal personality, i.e. 
delimited by the powers it has been granted to achieve its objectives,91 it is clear that International 
Organizations do not possess the whole set of rights and duties recognised by international law, but 
only those deriving from their purposes and functions ‘as specified or implied in [their] constituent 
documents and developed in practice’92 (so-called principle of specialty). In other words, human 
rights rules bind an International Organization only if (and to the extent which) they are relevant to 
the Organization’s purposes and functions.93  
 In this regard, one may first wonder whether the principle of specialty limits the accession 
of each International Organization to those treaties strictly coming within its domain. However, as 
explained by De Schutter, the two different issues at stake, accession to treaties, on the one hand, 
                                                          
88 See the following Section for a focus on the principle of specialty. 
89 European Court of Human Rights, Osman v. UK, para 116. See Macchi, Chap. 14, Sect. 14.3.2. 
90 ACtHR, Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 31 January 2006, App. No. 10566, 11748. 
91 Frid 1995, p 16. 
92 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, p 180. 
93 Le Floch 2015, p 393. 
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and attribution of competences, on the other, need to be kept separated. Indeed, an International 
Organization does not need to have competences in the specific domain of a human rights treaty, in 
order to accede to it.94 Rather, its competences will affect the way the Organization might 
accomplish the obligations contained in the treaty, as will be explained. 
A similar doubt may arise in assessing which customary rules concretely bind each 
International Organization, in view of its legal capacities and the sphere of its competences. Since 
International Organizations have a ‘functional’ legal capacity, are they bound only by human rights 
obligations coming under their domain of functions? To answer the question, again, a distinction is 
needed. In particular, we need to distinguish between specific activities to be performed in the field 
of human rights protection and promotion, on the one hand, and the need to respect human rights 
standards in completing other tasks, on the other. No doubt the activity of any Organization depends 
on the principle of specialty (therefore they can set up activities to ensure human rights protection, 
only if such action fits with their purposes and functions). In achieving their mission, though, 
International Organizations ‘have their freedom of action limited by certain rules of international 
law other than their own legal systems’.95 
This argument helps us to properly frame the problem. In fact, the distinction between 
competences attributed to the Organization and constraints to its activity deriving from international 
law does not exhaustively solve the issue. Rather, a more accurate analysis focusing on the nature 
(negative or positive) of each obligation is deemed necessary to fully understand the impact of the 
specialty principle on human rights duties. In particular, the principle of specialty does not affect 
negative obligations, but it has a relevance only with regard to the positive ones. As stated by De 
Schutter ‘insofar as the undertaking is purely negative [...], it is irrelevant whether or not the Party 
has the competence to take measures which implement the given standard. It is only where the 
undertaking is also to adopt certain measures – to fulfil positive obligations (to act) – that the 
question of competences may play a role’.96  
Indeed, International Organizations do not exist in a legal vacuum, and, consequently, they 
are bound by international law rules - requiring abstaining from directly violating human rights - in 
pursuing their mandate, also when they have very limited (or, even, completely lack) competencies 
in human rights protection and promotion. At the same time, though, whenever the Organization  is 
called by human right norms to  adopt  certain  positive measures,  it  would  have to respect the 
                                                          
94 De Schutter 2010, p 116. 
95 Le Floch 2015, p 394. According to this author, ‘with respect to human rights, all IOs have a duty of 
vigilance. Thus international financial institutions must ensure that their actions do not have an effect on the 
human rights situation in their borrowing members’ (ibid.). 
96 De Schutter 2010, p 114. 
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principle of specialty,97 which will in particular affect obligations of conduct and due diligence, as a 
variable standard, required by the Organization.  
This is a key point in our reconstruction, as the main aim of this Chapter is to explore the 
possibility of considering the Duty of Care as a corollary of positive obligations. In other words, 
concluding that positive obligations can bind an International Organization strictly depending on its 
competences would be tantamount to circumscribing the possibility of tracing the origins of the 
Duty of Care only in those cases in which the International Organization has been attributed 
specific competences in the field of human rights protection. 
However, it is argued here that the principle of specialty does not affect, in the same way, 
the International Organizations’ activity on the international plane, on the one hand, and its 
relationship with staff, on the other. While the principle of specialty explains the (limited) powers 
and competences of each Organization within the international community, according to the 
common interest it is called to pursue, the relationship between the Organization and its staff does 
not strictly depend upon the functions attributed by the States to the Organization. Here lies one of 
the main differences between positive obligations bearing upon States and those bearing upon 
International Organizations. While there is no distinction between what States are called to 
(positively) do to respect the human rights of one of their organs or agents, and what they are called 
to do for the benefit of other individuals under their jurisdiction, on the contrary, in the case of 
International Organizations, the principle of specialty might limit positive obligations, but only with 
reference to the possible role of the Organization in guaranteeing fundamental rights to individuals 
other than its personnel. It is true, obviously, that some activities might not be immediately 
practicable even for the benefit of staff members (in particular, civilian personnel sent on mission), 
but this would not depend on the competences attributed by States in the founding treaty, but rather 
on the material instruments available to each International Organization.98 
Macchi in the following Chapter provides a detailed analysis of the relationship that brings 
an International Organization’s personnel within its human rights jurisdiction.99 For the purposes of 
this Chapter, it is sufficient to recall some of the arguments Eagleton developed in identifying the 
bases for a UN claim for reparation in case of injuries suffered by UN agents.100 According to this 
author, ‘the Charter creates a bond  between  itself  and  its  agents  which, is  superior  to,  and  
                                                          
97 Ibid. 
98 See Gasbarri, Chap. 15 and Buscemi, Chap. 16. 
99 See Macchi, Chap. 14. 
100 See Capone, Chap. 17, Sect. 17.3.2. 
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exclusive  of,  the  bond  of  nationality  between the agent  and  his  own  state’101. More precisely, 
‘the United Nations exercises a control over the individual (agent) which the state of which he is a 
national does not have; the individual is independent of his own state so  far  as  his  work  and 
official actions are concerned, and the usual considerations based on national character are  
excluded’.102 Such an advantaged relationship between the International Organization and its 
personnel is further confirmed by the law on immunities and diplomatic privileges,103 attesting the 
existence of a special duty to protect International Organizations’ agents and a corresponding right 
of staff protection enjoyed by the Organization itself. Eagleton derives from these premises that ‘the 
relationship  of  control  and  protection  which  the United  Nations  exercises  over  its  agents  
furnishes  a  more sound  basis  for  claims  than  does  national  character;  and, likewise,  a  sound  
basis  for  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the United  Nations  for  acts  done  by  its  agents’.104 We 
argue here that this can be pushed further to stress that, since the capacity to impact human rights is 
connected to the control over individuals, considering that such control ‘simultaneously creates a 
potential for, and a duty to avoid, human rights abuse’,105 International Organizations have positive 
obligations to guarantee some basic human rights (life, health and security) to their staff, 
irrespective of their functions. 
 
13.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis demonstrates that the Duty of Care can be correctly considered a corollary of positive 
obligations, requiring International Organizations to take appropriate steps to safeguard the life of 
their staff members, as well as their health and safety. While positive obligations commonly refer to 
the duty of States over people under their ‘jurisdiction’, International Organizations are also bound 
by customary law human rights obligations requiring concrete measures of protection. Actually, 
human rights obligations concerning the right to life and to physical and moral integrity imply an 
inherent positive dimension, which does not depend on a convention provision.  
The principle of specialty, which moulds the legal personality of International 
Organizations, does not undermine this reconstruction, as it does not affect the positive human 
rights obligations of the Organization towards its personnel: in fact, the relationship between the 
                                                          
101 In particular, the author refers to Art 100 of the UN Charter. Such provision ‘not  only  requires the  agent  
to  reject  instructions  from  his  state  and  to  accept  only  those  from  the  United  Nations,  but  it  also  
requires States  Members  to  exercise  no  control  over  their  nationals  in  their  work  as  officials  of  the  
United  Nations’: Eagleton 1950, p 356. 
102 Eagleton 1950, p 357. 
103 See, mutatis mutandis, Eagleton 1950, p 357. 
104 Eagleton 1950, p 358. 
105 Mégret and Hoffmann 2003, p 323. 
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Organization and its staff does not strictly depend upon the functions attributed by the States to the 
Organization. 
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